Abstract-In the cloud context, pricing and capacity planning are two important factors to the profit of the infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers. This paper investigates the problem of joint pricing and capacity planning in the IaaS provider market with a set of software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers, where each SaaS provider leases the virtual machines (VMs) from the IaaS providers to provide cloud-based application services to its end-users. We study two market models, one with a monopoly IaaS provider market, the other with multiple-IaaS-provider market. For the monopoly IaaS provider market, we first study the SaaS providers' optimal decisions in terms of the amount of end-user requests to admit and the number of VMs to lease, given the resource price charged by the IaaS provider. Based on the best responses of the SaaS providers, we then derive the optimal solution to the problem of joint pricing and capacity planning to maximize the IaaS provider's profit. Next, for the market with multiple IaaS providers, we formulate the pricing and capacity planning competition among the IaaS providers as a three-stage Stackelberg game. We explore the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, and derive the conditions under which there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, we develop an iterative algorithm to achieve the Nash equilibrium.
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INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing provides an attractive paradigm for the dynamic provisioning of computing services in a "pay-as-you-go" manner. These services are typically classified into three categories [1] , [2] : infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), and software-as-a-service (SaaS). With IaaS, such as Amazon EC2, each physical machine is virtualized into multiple virtual machines (VMs), and the computing resources are leased to cloud costumers in the form of VMs. With PaaS, such as Google App Engine, a computing platform is delivered on which cloud users can develop and run their applications. With SaaS, the applications can be accessed over the Internet by end-users without software related cost and effort. In general, SaaS providers utilize the internal resources of their own data centers or rent resources from a specific IaaS provider. Fig. 1 shows a typical three-tier cloud computing market [3] , [4] . The end-users can get access to the applications provided by SaaS providers over the Internet. To serve their customers, SaaS providers lease computing resources from IaaS providers. The scenario we consider in this paper is that SaaS providers cannot afford to establish their own data centers to server users' requests, and thus lease resources from IaaS providers without upfront investment in infrastructure and software. For example, Animoto is a company that creates videos out of images, music, and video fragments submitted by end-users. It does not own a single server and bases its computing infrastructure entirely on Amazon Web Services [5] . In this paper, we mainly focus on the IaaS layer and its interaction with SaaS layer.
In the cloud context, pricing is an important factor to the economics of the provider. Recently, lots of pricing-based scheme have been studied, including auction-style pricing [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , competition-based pricing game [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , etc. Most of these works focus on designing a better pricing scheme to maximize the cloud provider's profit with a fixed cloud capacity. It is worth noting that under-provision of the cloud capacity can cause resource shortage and revenue loss, while over-provision of the cloud capacity can result in idled resources and unnecessary energy cost.
Notably, some works studied both the problem of optimal pricing and capacity right-sizing for the case with one IaaS provider [18] , [19] , but the competition among multiple IaaS providers were not considered. Thus, we are motivated to study the problem of joint pricing and capacity planning in the IaaS cloud market with two market models: one with a monopoly IaaS provider, the other with multiple IaaS providers.
In the market, both the SaaS providers and IaaS providers have their own interests. On one hand, the SaaS provider's objective is to maximize its revenue by serving end-users' requests and minimize the cost of rent resources while guaranteeing quality of service (QoS) (e.g., response time) specified in service level agreement (SLA). On the other hand, the IaaS provider aims to maximize its profit by optimizing the price and capacity. Since price has a great impact on SaaS providers' demand for resources, we first study the optimal decisions and behavior of SaaS providers.
Then we investigate the IaaS provider's profit maximization problem in two market models.
We summarize below the main contributions of this paper:
1. We formulate the profit maximization problem for each SaaS provider by taking SLA into consideration. Given the resource price, we derive the analytical expressions for its optimal decisions in terms of the amount of end-user requests to admit and the number of VMs to lease. 2. For the monopoly IaaS provider market, we study the profit maximization problem for the IaaS provider by jointly optimizing the price and cloud capacity, and derive the optimal solutions. 3. For the market with multiple IaaS providers, we formulate the pricing and capacity planning competition among the IaaS providers as a three-stage Stackelberg game. We derive the conditions where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and develop an iterative algorithm to reach the equilibrium. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After the related work in Section 2, we introduce the system model in Section 3. In Section 4, we formulate the profit maximization problem for the SaaS providers and derive the analytical expressions of the optimal solutions. In Section 5, based on the best responses of the SaaS providers, we study the problem of joint pricing and capacity planning in the monopoly IaaS provider market. Then, we study the pricing and capacity planning competition among multiple IaaS providers in Section 6. The numerical results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we present a review of related works centered around pricing and capacity right-sizing in cloud environment, respectively.
Pricing in the Cloud Environment
Pricing has been widely used as a lever to enable efficient resource management in various domains such as Internet services [20] , Grid computing [21] , and smart grid [22] .
In cloud computing, Sharma et al. [23] developed a cloud resource pricing algorithm by employing financial option theory, where the cloud resources are treated as underlying assets to capture its realistic value. Menache et al. [24] proposed a usage-based pricing scheme to maximize the longterm social welfare, which comprises of the aggregate utility of users minus the operating cost of service provider. Kantere et al. [25] designed a novel demand-pricing model for cloud caching services and proposed a dynamic pricing scheme to maximize the cloud provider's profit. By exploiting the interplay between pricing and workload scheduling, Ren and van der Schaar [26] developed an online algorithm to maximize a wireless service provider's profit.
Many works have studied pricing in the spot instance market [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , which was first introduced by Amazon on 2009 [27] . In [6] , the authors compared the performance of fixed and market pricing, and examined the tradeoffs for a cloud provider deliberating whether or not to operate a spot market. Zhang et al. [7] studied the problem of VM resource allocation by introducing an autoregressive model to predict the traffic demands of end users, and then formulated a knapsack problem to determine the current spot price for each spot market. For the case where users with heterogeneous demands could come and leave on the fly, Zhang et al. [8] first designed a bidding language, and based on that the authors proposed a truthful online cloud auction mechanism whose worst-case performance is well-bounded. Wang et al. [9] proposed a suite of computationally efficient and truthful auction-style pricing mechanisms, which enable users to fairly compete for resources and cloud providers to increase their overall revenue. For the scenario where a IaaS cloud provider which updates the spot price according to market demand, Xu and Li [10] formulated a stochastic dynamic program and obtained the optimal pricing policies for revenue maximization.
Game theory was used to model the interaction between one IaaS provider and multiple SaaS providers in [28] , [29] . In [28] , the authors devised a two-stage service provisioning and pricing strategy, where the conflicting situation in the second stage was modeled as a Stackelberg game. Based on Generalized Nash game model, Ardagna et al. [29] developed an efficient algorithm for the price determination and run time allocation of a IaaS provider's resource to competing SaaS providers.
The above works focused on the designing of an optimal pricing scheme for one cloud provider. Price competition in the market with multiple cloud providers has been studied in [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [30] .
For the competitive cloud environment, Macias and Guitart [11] proposed a genetic algorithm for pricing, where a naive pricing function evolves to a pricing function that offers suitable prices in function of system status. TruongHuu and Tham [12] studied both competition and cooperation among the cloud providers. The competition among providers was formulated as a non-cooperative stochastic game and a dynamic price scheme was proposed. Feng et al. [13] studied the price competition in the market with multiple IaaS cloud providers, where demands from cloud users are sensitive to both price and finishing time. Huu and Tham [14] modeled the competition among cloud providers as Markov Decision Process, and designed a dynamic pricing scheme which converges to the equilibrium. In [15] , resource pricing game in geo-distributed clouds in studied, and a novel concave game is proposed to describe the competition among service providers. Pal and Hui [16] formulated a non-cooperative price and QoS game among multiple cloud providers, and computed the optimal provisioned capacity based on the equilibrium results. Anselmi et al. [17] developed a three-tier market model for a cloud marketplace with congestion and price competition, and characterized the competitive equilibria within each tier. Niyato et al. [30] studied the both the monopoly and oligopoly market, where private cloud as a buyer determines the price of the VMs, and then service provider as a seller determines the number of supplied VMs to the market.
Capacity Right-Sizing
Lin et al. [31] investigated the problem of dynamically rightsizing the data center by turning off servers, and proposed an online algorithm to achieve the energy saving. In cloud computing environment, Xu and Li [18] conducted price analysis with capacity right-sizing, and showed that the benefit of right-sizing critically depends on the unit cost of running the cloud. In [19] , the authors proposed an economic model that can be used to maximize the cloud provider's profit based on choosing the right-size in cloud data center.
Most of previous work considered optimal pricing with fixed cloud capacity. Notably, in [18] , [19] , the authors studied both the optimal pricing and capacity right-sizing for the monopoly market. Our work differs from the previous papers in that we studied the joint pricing and capacity planning (right-sizing) problem for both the monopoly IaaS provider market and the market with multiple IaaS providers.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an IaaS provider market with a set of SaaS providers, denoted by M ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M. The set of IaaS providers in the market is denoted by N ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N. Each IaaS provider is modeled as a collection of homogeneous servers, each of which is virtualized to K VMs. Similar to the assumption in the existing works [28] , [29] , [30] , we assume that the VMs are the same in terms of bandwith, CPU and storage, etc. The IaaS providers sell computational resources in the form of VMs. Each SaaS provider can lease the VMs from one IaaS provider to provide cloud-based application services to its end-users. For simplicity, we only consider a single application type.
We consider a discrete time model, where the timeslot length matches the timescale at which the decisions of pricing and capacity planning are made, e.g., hourly. Without loss of generality, we model the IaaS provider's cloud capacity as the number of VM instances that the IaaS provider can support [10] , [18] . Let x j ðtÞ denote the number of active servers in IaaS provider j at timeslot t, 8j 2 N . Then the cloud capacity of IaaS provider j at timeslot t can be written as c j ðtÞ ¼ Kx j ðtÞ. Note that the capacity model looks a little simplistic for the real world, but it could be a good start for the future analysis with the capacity model in practice.
The IaaS providers adopt a pay-as-you-go charging model: SaaS provider i that requires n i ðtÞ VMs from IaaS provider j incurs a monetary cost of p j ðtÞn i ðtÞ at timeslot t, where p j ðtÞ denotes the price per VM set by IaaS provider j at timeslot t. Joint optimization of price and capacity periodically occurs at each timeslot. We therefore consider a single time slot, and drop the timeslot notation in what follows.
The SaaS Provider's Profit Model
For a given price p, SaaS provider i decides the end-user request rate i 2 ½0; m i to admit and the number of VMs n i to rent, where m i denotes the maximum request arrival rate at the SaaS provider i. Note that m i can be predicted based on the prediction methods [32] .
Given the admitted request rate i , SaaS provider i's utility by serving the requests can be written as
where v i denotes the utility level of SaaS provider i. The nonlinear utility function we adopted in the paper is the same as that in [33] , which is based on the law of diminishing marginal utility in economics.
SaaS provider i's profit is the difference between the utility obtained through serving the end-user requests and the cost sustained for using the VMs supplied by the IaaS provider, which can be written as
The end-user requests hosted in a VM is modeled as a M/G/1 queue [29] . Let m denote the maximum service rate on the VM. Assuming that the work load is evenly shared among the rent VMs, the average response time of SaaS provider i is given by [28] , [29] 
To guarantee the equilibrium conditions for the M/G/1 queues, the condition i < mn i must hold for a given m, since otherwise the queue will go infinitely long and the system will not have a stationary distribution. Without loss of generality, the service rate of a VM is assumed to be 1 in what follows [31] .
We assume that the SLA between SaaS provider i and its users takes the form of an upper bound on the response time rð i ; n i Þ [28] , 8i 2 M. Thus, SaaS provider i should satisfy the constraint rð i ; n i Þ d i , where d i is the maximum average response time guaranteed by SaaS provider i.
The IaaS Provider's Profit Model
One common model of energy cost for a typical server is the affine function eð 0 Þ ¼ e 0 þ e 1 0 , where 0 is the end-user request arrival rate at this server, and e 0 models the fixed energy cost independent of workload, and e 1 is the energy cost per unit of end-user request rate to serve [31] .
For any given IaaS provider, let
x denote the end-user request arrival rates at servers 1; 2; . . . ; x, respectively. Then the energy cost of the IaaS provider can be written as
In the monopoly market with IaaS provider j, its profit is the difference between the revenue obtained by providing VMs to SaaS providers and the energy cost for maintaining the active servers, which is given by
Note that the system model we considered is different from that in [31] . In our model, SaaS providers have direct interaction with end-users, and thus they are responsible for the delay of processing end-users' requests, i.e., each SaaS provider has a maximum response time guarantee for its users. Therefore, in this paper the delay cost is not considered in the IaaS provider's profit model [3] , [18] .
OPTIMAL DECISIONS OF THE SAAS PROVIDERS
In this section, we derive the optimal decisions of the SaaS providers for a given VM price p in the monopoly IaaS provider market. For SaaS provider i, the optimal end-user request rate Ã i ðpÞ to admit and the number of VMs n Ã i ðpÞ to rent are the solutions to the following optimization problem:
where the first constraint ensures that the admitted enduser request rate Ã i can not exceed the end-user request arrival rate m i at SaaS provider i, the second constraint states that d i is the maximum average response time guaranteed by SaaS provider i, and the constraint i < n i is the result of assuming that m ¼ 1, such that the request rate 1 is the largest that a VM can stabilize.
For a fixed i , problem (1) can be simplified to
Solving the above problem, we have that the optimal n Ã i
can be written as
Based on (1) and (3), the optimal Ã i can be obtained by solving the following problem:
variable f i g:
Since logðxÞ is concave with respect to x, we have that logð1 þ i Þ is concave with respect to i , based on the result about the composition with affine mapping [34] . Therefore, the objective function in problem (4) is concave with respect to i . Based on the first order condition and boundary conditions, the optimal Ã i ðpÞ can be written as
where ½a þ ¼ maxfa; 0g.
Accordingly, the optimal n Ã i ðpÞ is given by
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the end-user request arrival rate m i at SaaS provider i (i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M) is relatively large such that Ã i ðpÞ in (5) can be rewritten as
Note that in this paper we do not impose that the variables x and n i be integer valued [31] . This is acceptable since the number of servers x in a typical data center is large, and also [29] justified the use of relaxed n i .
For the sake of clarity, some important notations adopted in the paper are summarized in Table 1 .
JOINT PRICING AND CAPACITY PLANNING IN THE MONOPOLY IAAS PROVIDER MARKET
Based on the optimal decisions of the SaaS providers, in this section we study the joint pricing and capacity planning for the IaaS provider to maximize its profit P ðp; xÞ in the monopoly IaaS provider market. We assume that the SaaS providers send the information of guaranteed maximum average response time d i s and the utility levels v i s to the IaaS provider [29] . In this section, we drop the subscript of p j and x j , and use p and x to denote the two decision variables of the IaaS provider in the monopoly market.
To simplify the expression of Ã i ðpÞ, we assume that the IaaS provider sets a maximum price p U given by
Obviously, the maximum price p U ensures that SaaS providers have nonzero demand for VMs. Based on maximum price p U , Ã i ðpÞ in (7) can be further rewritten as
Based on (6) and (9), the objective function P ðp; xÞ of the IaaS provider can be written as
where
. Let X denote the total number of servers in the IaaS provider's data center. To ensure that the total demand for VMs does not exceed the maximum supply, i.e.,
the IaaS provider sets a minimum price p L for each VM, which is given by
Thus, the feasible range of price p in the monopoly IaaS provider market is ½p L ; P U . Based on (10), we can see that maximizing P ðp; xÞ is equivalent to minimizing
p þ e 0 x. Thus, in the monopoly IaaS provider market, the optimal price p Ã and number of active servers x Ã can be determined by solving the following optimization problem:
x X variables fp; xg; (11) where the second constraint ensures that the total number of demanded VMs does not exceed the IaaS provider's supply.
Given the number of active servers x, the optimization problem (11) can be rewritten as follows:
Since problem (12) is a convex optimization problem with respect to p, the optimal price p Ã can be determined by the first order condition and boundary conditions. Let p T denote the price at which the first order differentiation of the objective function in problem (12) 
2) Case
The optimal price p Ã is determined by the first order condition, and is given by
3) Case
The optimal price p Ã is given by
Based on the expression of the optimal price p Ã , the optimal number of active servers x Ã for the first two cases is
For the third case, the optimal price p Ã is a function of the number of active servers x. Then, with (11) and (13), the optimal x Ã can be obtained by solving the following problem:
It is easy to see that problem (14) is a convex optimization problem, and thus the optimal x Ã can be determined by the first order condition and boundary conditions.
PRICING AND CAPACITY PLANNING GAME IN THE MULTIPLE-IAAS-PROVIDER MARKET
In this section, we consider the case where there are multiple IaaS providers in the cloud market. They compete with each other in terms of prices and available capacities in order to maximize their profit. We assume that both the IaaS and SaaS providers are selfish and rational. Observe that the interaction between the IaaS and SaaS providers is a typical leader-follower game that can be analyzed by using the Stackelberg game framework. Specifically, we cast this interaction as a three-stage Stackelberg game, where the IaaS and SaaS providers adapt their decisions dynamically to reach an equilibrium point.
In the three-stage Stackelberg game, the IaaS providers first simultaneously determine their available capacities at Stage One, and then at Stage Two they simultaneously determine the VM prices to the SaaS providers. Finally, each SaaS provider chooses one IaaS provider to process its end-user requests at Stage Three.
Analysis of the Three-Stage Stackelberg Game
We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the threestage Stackelberg game by using the backward induction method.
Given the set of prices p, based on (6) and (9), the total SaaS providers' demand for VMs at the IaaS provider j can be written as
where M j denotes the set of SaaS providers choosing the IaaS provider j, and p Àj denotes the set of prices of IaaS providers other than IaaS provider j.
It is easy to show that both D j and M j depend on prices p. In this paper, we assume that the IaaS providers with the same price are picked by the SaaS providers with equal probability. Let N L ¼ fjjp j ¼ min h2N fp h g; j 2 N g denote the set of IaaS providers with the lowest nonzero price in N . Thus, the demand function in (16) can be rewritten as
otherwise:
( In this section, we assume that all the SaaS providers have the same maximum average response time guarantee, i. e.,
. . . ; M. Thus, we have that the total end-user request arrival rate at IaaS provider j can be written as
otherwise: 
The price competition among the IaaS providers can be cast as the following game:
Game at stage two. All the IaaS providers in the set N 1 are the players; the strategy of IaaS provider j is to choose a price p j from the feasible set ½p L ; p U , 8j 2 N 1 ; the objective of IaaS provider j is to maximize P j ðp j ; x j ; p Àj ; x Àj Þ, 8j 2 N 1 .
Proposition
From the above proposition, we can see that if the loaddependent energy cost e 1 is large, the IaaS providers would set a higher price to discourage the SaaS providers, and thus reduce the arrived end-user requests. When e 1 is small, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For the case with e 1 ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , a necessary and sufficient condition for the IaaS providers to achieve a Nash equilibrium price is
x j X holds, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium price for the IaaS providers in the set N 1 , which is given by
Proof. Please see Appendix A. t u Since x j ¼ 0; 8j = 2 N 1 , the optimal p Ã in (17) can be rewritten as
3) Capacity planning competition of the IaaS providers at stage one. At this stage, the IaaS providers determine the optimal number of active servers to maximize their profit.
For the case with e 1 > ððP L Þ 2 G 2 =G 3 , the optimal p Ã is independent of x j , and we have that the profit function of IaaS provider j is monotonically decreasing with x j , 8j 2 N . Thus, the optimal x Ã j is determined to make the supply equal to the demand, and is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For the case with e 1 > ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , the optimal x Ã j is uniquely determined by
For the case with e 1 ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , we have that the optimal price is determined by (18) , and the demand D j is equal to the supply x j , 8j 2 N . Thus, the profit function of IaaS provider j can be expressed as
whereê ¼ e 0 þ e 1 ðd À 1Þ=d.
Thus, for the case with e 1 ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , the capacity planning competition among the IaaS providers at Stage One can be modeled as the following game:
Game at stage one. The IaaS providers in N are the players; the strategy of IaaS provider j is to choose x j over ½X L À 1 T x Àj ; X À 1 T x Àj , and its objective is to maximize P j ðx j ; x Àj Þ.
Due to the concavity of P j ðx j ; x Àj Þ in x j , the existence of the Nash equilibrium of the game at Stage One can be readily shown.
Next, we show the conditions where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. The best response strategy of IaaS provider j can be obtained by checking the first order condition and the boundary conditions, which are shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. For the case with e 1 ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , the best response strategy x Ã j for IaaS provider j is given as follows.
1) The case withê
2) The case with
3) The case with 0 <ê G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ:
Proof. Please see Appendix B. t u
Note thatê is weighted sum of e 0 and e 1 . Based on Proposition 4, the conditions where there exists a unique Nash equilibrium capacity are shown as follows. 
Algorithm for Achieving the Nash Equilibria
Next, we present an iterative algorithm for each IaaS provider to reach the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game in the market with multiple IaaS providers.
Based on Propositions 1 and 3, if e 1 > ððP L Þ 2 G 2 Þ=G 3 , the load-dependent energy cost is large, and each IaaS provider sets a higher price and smaller capacity, which are given by (16) 
Each IaaS provider sets price as
Þgg, and broadcasts p The convergence of Algorithm 1 is given as follows.
Proposition 7. Algorithm 1 converges to the equilibrium of the pricing and capacity planning game.
Proof. Please see Appendix D. t u
Extension to the Market with Heterogeneous IaaS Providers
In previous sections, we assumed that IaaS providers are homogeneous, and the maximum available capacity is same for each IaaS provider, i.e., X. In this section, we extend to the case with heterogeneous IaaS providers, where the maximum number of servers in the IaaS providers are denoted by X 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X N , respectively. In the price competition, IaaS provider j chooses price p j from its feasible set ½p
Without loss of generality, we reorder the IaaS providers in the form of
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Based on the result and proof of Proposition 2, we have that X L P j2N x j X N is the sufficient and necessary condition for achieving the unique equilibrium price in the market with heterogeneous IaaS providers, and the equilibrium price is given by (17) 
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed joint pricing and capacity planning scheme for the monopoly IaaS provider market and the Nash equilibrium of the threestage game in the market with multiple IaaS providers.
Simulation Setup
We use Matlab as the tool to evaluate the performance in the two different kinds of markets. For each SaaS provider, we assume that the end-user's request arrival rate follows Poisson distribution with the mean uniformly distributed in the interval [50, 70] . Each SaaS provider's utility level v i is generated uniformly in some intervals, e.g., a smaller one [4, 6] , and a larger one [50, 60] . Without loss of generality, we assume all the SaaS providers have the same average response time guarantee, i.e., d i ¼ 4.
Each IaaS provider has a maximum of X servers, and each server is virtualized to K VMs. The IaaS provider's energy cost is characterized by parameters e 0 and e 1 . Since the energy consumption of current servers is dominated by the fixed cost [35] , we choose units such that the loaddependent energy consumption e 1 is zero. Thus, during the numerical analysis, each IaaS provider's energy cost is determined by e 0 and the number of active servers x j , j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N.
In the simulation, we change the parameters N, M, X, K, e 0 , and v i (i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M), in order to evaluate the performance under different circumstances.
Analysis of the Numerical Results
In this section, we first compare the profit achieved by our proposed scheme to the scheme with fixed capacity in the monopoly IaaS provider market. Then we discuss the Nash equilibrium in the market with multiple IaaS providers, and evaluate the performance achieved at the equilibrium.
Monopoly IaaS Provider Market
For the monopoly IaaS provider market, we adopt the scheme of optimal pricing with fixed capacity C 1 as comparison, where the number of active servers is fixed as X 1 ¼ 20. We assume there are M ¼ 10 SaaS providers in the monopoly market. Each server in the IaaS cloud is virtualized to K ¼ 5 VMs. The fixed energy cost e 0 is varied from 0.5 to 10, and the corresponding price and profit of the IaaS provider are shown at Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
From Fig. 2 , we can see that the IaaS provider chooses a higher price if the SaaS providers have relatively higher utility levels. Intuitively, the SaaS providers with higher utility levels have more willingness to rent the VMs. Thus, the IaaS provider can set a higher price without decreasing the demand. It can also be shown that the price does not change with respect to the fixed energy cost e 0 in the scheme of optimal pricing with fixed capacity, while in our proposed scheme the price increases as the fixed energy cost increases. If e 0 is small, the IaaS provider sets a smaller price to attract more demand. While for the case with a larger e 0 , the energy cost of maintaining an active server is larger, and thus the IaaS provider chooses a higher price to decrease the demand. Fig. 3 shows the IaaS provider's profit versus fixed energy cost e 0 under the setting with different SaaS providers' utility levels. Figs. 3a and 3b correspond to the case with smaller and larger utility levels, respectively. We can see that the IaaS provider achieves more profit if the SaaS providers have larger utility levels. Moreover, it can be shown from Fig. 3 that the IaaS provider's profit decreases as fixed energy cost e 0 increases. As e 0 increases, the profit gap between the proposed scheme and optimal pricing with fixed capacity increases rapidly. With a larger e 0 , the energy cost constitutes a major part in the IaaS provider's profit. Since the scheme with fixed capacity does not change the number of active servers, the IaaS provider's profit decreases linearly as e 0 increases. While in our proposed scheme, in order to maintain a higher profit, the IaaS provider changes its number of active servers with respect to e 0 .
Market with Multiple IaaS Providers
Figs. 4 and 5 show the convergence of capacity equilibrium in the market with multiple IaaS providers. Fig. 4 illustrates the converging process in the market with N ¼ 4 IaaS providers, where Fig. 4a corresponds to the case with M ¼ 6 and X ¼ 20, and Fig. 4b corresponds to the case with M ¼ 10 and X ¼ 30. In Fig. 4 , we choose K ¼ 1 and e 0 ¼ 1, and assume that SaaS providers' utility levels v i s are generated uniformly in the interval [4, 6] . As we can see from Fig. 4 , the sum of initial number of active servers is greater than X, i.e., P j2N x j ! X, in which case there is no equilibrium point based on Proposition 2. Each IaaS provider updates its number of active servers based on its current demand. Once the total supply is within the feasible region, each IaaS provider updates its supply based on Proposition 4. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point can be further verified in Fig. 4 . Since we choose a larger X in Fig. 4b , the equilibrium capacity is larger than that in Fig. 4a . Fig. 5 corresponds to the case with N ¼ 8 IaaS providers. In this setting, we choose M ¼ 12, K ¼ 1, X ¼ 50, d i ¼ 8 and e 0 ¼ 0:7. SaaS providers' utility levels v i s are generated uniformly in the interval [2, 6] . Most of the observations from the case with N ¼ 4 IaaS providers still hold here. It can be seen that the number of iterations to reach the equilibrium is larger than the case with N ¼ 4 IaaS providers, while the convergence rate is still quite fast. Fig. 6 shows how the equilibrium price evolves under different X and different utility levels v i s. Specifically, we set M ¼ 100, N ¼ 4, K ¼ 1, and e 0 ¼ 1. The maximum number of servers X for each IaaS provider varies from 20 to 200. As expected, the equilibrium price increases with v i . For any given v i s, the equilibrium price decreases with the maximum number of servers X. As the total capacity increases, the IaaS providers can accommodate more enduser requests, and thus they decrease the price to attract more demand.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the performance of the derived Nash equilibrium. The number of SaaS providers is M ¼ 100. We exploit the total profit of all the IaaS providers as the performance measure. We compare this to the profit of the system if it were centrally optimized, that is, there exists a central planner to enforce a globally optimal solution. Specifically, we are interested in the ratio between the total profit achieved at the derived Nash equilibrium and that achieved at the optimal centralized solution.
In Fig. 7 , the number of IaaS providers is fixed as N ¼ 4, whereas the maximum number of servers X in each IaaS cloud varies from 20 to 200. Fig. 7a shows the total profit of all the IaaS providers as X increases. It can be seen that the performance gap between the derived Nash equilibrium and optimal centralized solution becomes smaller as X increases. Since we have the constraint P j2N x j X at the Nash equilibrium, a larger X enables a higher opportunity for the IaaS providers to choose the optimal x j s to maximize their profit. Moreover, due to the energy cost, the optimal centralized solution remains fixed when X exceeds some point. Thus, as X becomes larger, the derived Nash equilibrium will coincide with the optimal centralized solution. As shown in Fig. 7b , the ratio between the derived Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized solution approaches to 1 as X increases. We can also see that the ratio for the case with smaller utility levels is larger than the case with larger utility levels. Fig. 8 shows the ratio between the total profit achieved at the derived Nash equilibrium and that achieved at the optimal centralized solution as the number of IaaS providers N increases, under the setting with different X. SaaS providers' utility levels v i s are generated uniformly in the interval [6, 10] . We can see that the ratio first decreases as N increases, and then the ratio remains fixed when N exceeds some point. The larger the X, the higher the ratio. Since current data center usually has a large number of servers, i.e., a large X, the ratio between the derived Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized solution would be high.
CONCLUSION
This paper studied joint pricing and capacity planning in the IaaS provider market, where each SaaS provider leases VMs from the IaaS providers to provide cloud-based application services to its end-users. For the monopoly IaaS provider market, we first formulated the profit maximization problem for each SaaS provider, and derived its optimal decisions in terms of the amount of end-user requests to admit and the number of VMs to lease. Based on the best responses of the SaaS providers, we then derived the optimal solution to the problem of joint pricing and capacity planning to maximize the IaaS provider's profit. Next, for the market with multiple IaaS providers, we formulated the pricing and capacity planning competition among the IaaS providers as a three-stage Stackelberg game. We characterized the conditions under which there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and developed an iterative algorithm to achieve the equilibrium.
For future work, it would be interesting to consider the heterogenous case where the VM instances provided by each IaaS provider are different. Also, it would be Fig. 7 . Performance comparison between the Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized solution. interesting to consider the case where the VM migration and consolidation are exploited to increase IaaS providers' profit further.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first show that X L P j2N 1
x j X is a necessary condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium price. In the price competition game, each IaaS provider j chooses p j from ½p L ; p U . When P j2N 1
x j ! X, the total supply is greater than the total demand. There must be some IaaS providers whose capacity are not fully used. Thus, in order to increase the total profit, those IaaS providers can always decrease their capacities to make the supply equal to the demand. When P j2N 1
x j X L , the total supply is smaller than the total demand. There must be some IaaS providers whose demand is greater than the capacity. Those IaaS providers can always increase the price to achieve more profit. There, we can see that there is no equilibrium price when P
We next show that X L P j2N 1
x j X is a sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium price, and the unique equilibrium price is determined by (17) when the condition holds.
First, we consider the simple case with two IaaS providers, i.e., IaaS provider 1 and IaaS provider 2, and their number of active servers is x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that x 1 ! x 2 . Since it is only when demand equals to supply that each IaaS provider can achieve the maximum profit, the optimal price for each IaaS provider can be determined by (13) . With x 1 ! x 2 , we have that p
Then all the SaaS providers would choose the IaaS provider 1, leading to IaaS provider 2 with no profit. In this case, to attract some SaaS providers, IaaS provider 2 will decrease its price less than or equal to IaaS provider 1. The price decreasing will continue unless the two IaaS providers announce the same price.
Next, we illustrate that the equilibrium price is determined by (17) . Assuming that the equilibrium price p Ã a is not equal to p Ã in (17), we have that the total demand is not equal to the total supply. For the case with p Ã a > p Ã , the total demand is less than the total supply. Assuming that IaaS provider 1's demand is less than its supply, IaaS provider 1 would decrease its price to make demand equal to supply, which also makes IaaS provider 2 decrease its price to attract SaaS providers. Thus, both IaaS providers will decrease their prices when p Ã a > p Ã . For the case with p Ã a < p Ã , the total demand is greater than the total supply. Assuming that IaaS provider 1's demand is greater than its supply, IaaS provider 1 would increase its price to make demand equal to supply, which makes IaaS provider 2's demand larger than its supply. To maximize the profit, IaaS provider 2 would increase its price. Thus, both IaaS providers will increase their prices when p Ã a < p Ã . Therefore, the equilibrium price is at p Ã determined by (17) . Since p Ã 2 ½p L ; p U , the total supply P j2N 1
x j satisfies the condition
The above results can be readily extended to the case with multiple IaaS providers.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
P j ðx j ; x Àj Þ is concave in x j . The first order condition is
The boundary conditions are
IaaS providers j's best response strategy can be written as follows.
1) The case withê ! p U :
x Àj Þ 0. Thus, the best strategy of IaaS providers is to let the number of active servers as small as possible, i. e., x
2) The case with G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ <ê < p U : In this case, P
x Àj Þ is monotonically increasing with respect
For IaaS provider j, its best response can be outlined as follows:
The best strategy of IaaS provider j can be derived by solving the first order condition:
3) The case with 0 <ê
x Àj Þ ¼ 0, and we have the other deci-
IaaS provider j, its best response can be outlined as follows:
The best strategy of IaaS provider j can be derived by the first order condition (20) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Since P j ðx j ; x Àj Þ is concave with respect to x j , the existence of the Nash equilibrium can be easily shown. Next, we study the conditions under which there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
1) The case withê ! p U : In this case, there exist infinite number of capacity equilibria that satisfy
2) The case with G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ <ê < p U : Let N a and N b denote the sets of IaaS providers choosing x Ã i as the solution to (20) 
, 8j1 2 N a and x Ã j2 , 8j2 2 N b denote the optimal number of active servers for the IaaS providers in set N a and N b , respectively. First, we assume that N a and N b are nonempty sets. Since
can be obtained by solving the following equation:
Solving (21), we have that
Also, based on the expression of X 0 ,ê needs to satisfŷ
If the condition in (22) holds, there exist infinite number of equilibria that satisfy X
If G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ <ê < minfp U ; e 0 g, then X 0 < ð1À 1=NÞX L , which means that either N a or N b is empty. For the case with N a ¼ ;; N b ¼ N , we have that 
3 
Solving the above equation, we have that (23) . Since e 0 > G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ, we have that there exist a unique capacity equilibrium for the case with 0 <ê G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ.
1. This result can be derived by the same way as the case with G 1 =ðG 2 þ KXÞ <ê < p U .
Therefore, ifê < minfp U ; e 0 g, there exists a unique capacity equilibrium, otherwise, there exists infinite number of equilibria.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
We first show that the condition X L P j2N 1 x j X holds when Algorithm 1 ends, which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of an unique equilibrium according to Proposition 2. We prove this by contradiction. x j Þ, which is the unique Nash equilibrium price according to Proposition 2. Based on the expression of price equilibrium, the objective in the capacity planning competition subgame is concave with respect to x j , j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N. Since the update of x j in Step 2 is based on best response strategy in Proposition 4, Algorithm 1 also converges to the capacity equilibrium.
Thus, Algorithm 1 converges to the equilibrium of joint pricing and capacity game.
